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Abstract— After the death of Mao Zedong in 
September 1976, the PRC opens a new page in its 
foreign policy history. This is mostly due to the 
reforms and transformations that Deng Xiaoping 
proclaimed. The change of sociopolitical and 
economic structures that had taken place laid the 
foundation for China’s entry into world leaders in 
some positions. By the time Deng Xiaoping came to 
power, the Chinese economy was in decline after the 
“political adventures” of Mao Zedong. To get out of 
this situation, it was necessary to liberalize the 
economic and social sectors, as well as solve a whole 
range of foreign policy problems (from establishing 
official diplomatic relations with the USA and 
improving relations with the USSR, to solving the 
problems of Hong Kong and Macao) in order to 
become a harmonious part of the world community. 
To strengthen its position in the Asia-Pacific region, 
China needed, first of all, to establish relations with 
all its neighbours and resolve territorial disputes, of 
which there were many. This article is supposed to 
consider the question of the attempts of the PRC to 
resolve existing differences on the disputed parts of 
the borders with the Republic of India. In the period 
under review, China had several territorial disputes 
with its neighbours, which did not allow to realize the 
foreign policy potential, and there was also not a 
sufficient number of allies and economic partners of 
the PRC. As an example of a solution to border 
disputes, one can cite a positive result achieved in the 
course of negotiations with the USSR on the 
demarcation of the border. If China managed to 
achieve its goals with its northern neighbor, the 
question with India still remains open. 
In our study, an attempt will be made to analyse the 
course of the negotiation process between the PRC 
and the Republic of India in the last quarter of the 
20th century and to identify the reasons for the lack 
of a decision on this issue. This analysis is interesting 
not only in terms of forecasting the development of 
the situation in the APR but also within the 
framework of other territorial problems of the PRC. 
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1. Introduction 
The origins of the Sino-Indian border conflict 
began in the period when British India was ruled by 
the British Crown, which marked the boundaries 
between the two current states. After gaining 
independence by the Republic of India in 1947 and 
the formation of the People's Republic of China in 
1949, the countries began to establish relations with 
their neighbors [1]. It soon became apparent that 
both countries did not have the same idea of where 
and how the border should pass. All attempts to 
resolve territorial disputes were unsuccessful. 
By the mid-1950s, the situation began to worsen, 
China switched to active operations in the Tibetan 
region: the Chinese introduced military personnel 
of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) 
into the region, launched the construction of 
strategic highways, airfields, new control points, as 
well as issuing maps, in which the disputed 
territories were included in the PRC [2, 3,4]. 
The consequence of this was several diplomatic 
statements from India. In response, in 1959, Zhou 
Enllay sent a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, in 
which he officially declared that the border 
between India and China was never designated 
formally and secured by an agreement signed by 
the leaders of the two countries, which means 
China refused to recognize the borderline 
McMahon [3]. 
In August 1959, parts of the PLA fired upon the 
Indian border checkpoint in the Longju area. In 
October, Indian positions were fired on the territory 
of the Kongka Pass in the west of the border, which 
resulted in the death of nine Indian soldiers. 
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According to many Indian political figures of that 
time, it was precisely these clashes that became key 
moments in shaping the negative attitude of India 
to China [4]. In 1961, armed conflicts became 
frequent between the armed border forces of both 
countries, which in October 1962 escalated into 
full-scale hostilities. The active phase of the so-
called "border war" lasted 31 days and ended in the 
defeat of India [5]. 
Referring to the Indian data, it can be argued that in 
the period from June 1955 to July 1962, about 30 
clashes occurred. As a result, China has occupied 
about 15 thousand square meters. Miles of the 
territory [5]. The Indian Parliament adopted a 
resolution on the liberation of the territories seized 
by China, which is still valid today. 
The world community closely followed the 
developments in the region and condemned the 
aggressive actions of the PRC. China did not 
receive official support from any state, the USSR 
also did not support its ally, calling for a cease-fire. 
Despite the reaction of foreign countries, border 
armed clashes on borders continued in the future. 
Since 1962, the situation in the region has become 
aggravated by the fact of the convergence of the 
PRC and Pakistan. Closer relations were 
established between the countries, and final 
agreements were reached on the common border of 
the Chinese Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR). The coalition of China and Pakistan was 
beneficial to the parties not only in the light of the 
aggravated relations with India but also the general 
situation in South Asia. 
The situation began to change only from 1976 
when significant internal political changes took 
place in the PRC and India. The death of Mao 
Zedong and the collapse of the "gang of four" in 
China and the coming to power in India of the 
association "Bharatiya Janata Party" (Bharatiya 
Janata Party) gave hope for resolving the situation 
at the border. But if for the new leadership of India, 
the foreign policy doctrine remained unchanged, 
then the policy of the PRC began to change with 
the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping [6]. 
2. Methods 
In the course of the study, problem-chronological 
and historical-comparative methods were used, 
which made it possible to chronologically and 
reliably present the facts of the negotiation process 
between the PRC and the Republic of India. An 
analytical method was also used, which allowed 
understanding the causes of events. The method of 
studying the process allowed us to identify key 




3. Results and Discussion  
Despite the changes that began in the two countries 
before the 1980s, the negotiation process between 
China and India did not have positive trends, 
although the parties tried to establish a dialogue. 
With the return of Indira Gandhi to power in India 
in January 1980, the policy of establishing peace 
with China was proclaimed. Already in April, 
Indira Gandhi met with the Second Chairman of the 
CPC Central Committee, Hua Guofeng, and the 
Second Premier of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of China, Huang Hua. They once again 
confirmed the position of each of the parties. China 
set about stabilizing relations to bypass the conflict, 
India did not intend to abandon its principles in 
resolving territorial issues, but both sides realized 
the need to determine the border issue. 
In June 1981, Huang Hua visited Delhi [7]. During 
the meeting, it was possible to get the issue off the 
ground. India went to the negotiations even though 
Beijing did not vacate the occupied disputed 
territories, which had previously been the primary 
condition for the start of negotiations. The meeting 
discussed possible methods for resolving the 
conflict. China refused to consider the disputed 
parts of the border along the line of the "complex 
deal," which meant the removal of contradictions 
that could cast doubt on the prospects of further 
negotiations. Also, Delhi softened its position by 
proposing closer economic and social relations 
between the countries. Thus, at the meeting, the 
main agreements were reached to continue the 
negotiation process, as well as the prospect of 
cooperation between the countries. In fact, these 
were the first significant shifts in the negotiation 
process. 
In October 1982, Indira Gandhi met with Premier 
of the PRC State Council Zhao Ziyang, at which 
the positive results of previous negotiations were 
consolidated, and Indira Gandhi was invited to visit 
Beijing on an official visit. It should be noted that, 
despite the protracted nature of the negotiation 
process, there were still positive developments. 
Both China and India softened their positions to 
reach a final agreement by supply chain 
management. 
Unfortunately, the negotiations that took place in 
1983 were not so successful. The main stumbling 
block was the question of the procedure for 
considering disputed parts of the border. India 
preferred a sectoral consideration of a controversial 
issue, while the Chinese side returned to a 
comprehensive solution to the territorial problem, 
examining all three sections of the border 
simultaneously, based on the principle of a single 
watershed [8]. Although this round of negotiations 
did not bring fundamental changes in the solution 
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of the border issue, however, the participants were 
able to agree on the non-use of military force. 
During the subsequent round of talks held in 1984 
in Beijing, a warming relationship between the 
parties was noted. It was decided to consider the 
controversial parts of the borders sectoral [9-15]. 
Besides, the Indian government was ready to make 
some compromises, but this was not to be: the 
tragic death of Indira Gandhi stopped the 
negotiations for a long time. 
The newly elected Indian government, headed by 
Rajiv Gandhi, in December 1984, announced its 
desire to streamline and normalize relations with all 
neighbouring countries, including China. Already 
in November 1985, finally, the next round of 
negotiations on the border issue took place, which 
was to be a turning point, since the parties had to 
proceed to discuss key issues. However, the 
consensus was not reached: China still recognized 
the McMahon line as a ceasefire line, not the 
official borderline, and also did not recognize 
Sikkim part of India [10, 16- 24]. 
The negotiations of 1986-1987 did not bring 
positive changes. This was connected not only with 
the regular armed incidents on the disputed parts of 
the border, which were regarded as a violation of 
the agreements reached earlier but also by the harsh 
statements made by representatives of the PRC 
government on the border issue [11, 25, 26]. 
However, further escalation of the tension did not 
occur, mainly because the PRC government would 
have difficulty in justifying the next military 
clashes on the disputed parts of the border. 
Held in 1987-1988 The meetings of representatives 
of the PRC and India showed that both parties are 
incredibly interested in getting out of the current 
impasse. Negotiations were generally held in a 
friendly atmosphere. According to the political 
leaders of India and China, relations between the 
countries needed restructuring and renewal; the 
parties had to refrain from any violent actions in 
the border areas, as well as to find ways to establish 
peaceful and friendly relations, avoiding past 
misunderstandings. 
Of course, this whole reset was not only because 
India and China realized that they were at a dead 
end in the negotiations. The situation in the world 
changed; the Cold War ended, the world ceased to 
be bipolar. 
Another factor was that during this time, China and 
India had changed significantly. Having improved 
the economic situation, each country began to act 
independently, recognizing itself as an important 
political and economic strength of the region. Also, 
there was an understanding that the solution of a 
disputed border issue can contribute not only to the 
growth of mutually beneficial cooperation but also 
to the stability and prosperity of the entire region. 
China understood that the acquired status of 
nuclear power must be taken into account. 
In December 1988, during Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to 
the PRC, the prospects for peaceful cooperation 
between the two countries were discussed. The 
Chinese side was extremely optimistic about 
India’s recognition of Tibet as part of China, as 
well as the readiness of the Indian government to 
express its full support for its Chinese counterparts 
in the fight against Tibetan anti-government 
speeches and in resolving the Tibet issue [12]. 
Based on the agreements reached earlier, in July 
1989, a meeting of Indian and Chinese expert 
groups was held to discuss the conflict. India was 
represented by Secretary of Foreign Affairs SK 
Singh, while Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing 
headed the Chinese delegation. The primary 
purpose of the gathering was to search for a path of 
peaceful settlement, reduce the concentration of 
military units, as well as establish peace and order 
in the Himalayan region [13, 25]. 
In the same 1989, a representative of the PRC, 
Deputy Prime Minister of the PRC, U Xuetsyan, 
visited India. Similar to the last meeting, the main 
goal of the talks was to achieve peace and order in 
the border zone. The Chinese country stressed that 
India is a leader in South Asia and is the guarantor 
of peace and security. Indian Foreign Minister 
Narasimha Rao noted that the resolution of the 
border conflict is possible only after the elections in 
India in 1990 [14]. 
The government of the national front, which came 
to power after the elections, headed by SK Singh 
reaffirmed the course towards improving and 
strengthening relations with the PRC, especially 
economic and scientific-technical ones, as well as 
interaction in the international arena represented by 
various economic and political organizations. In 
March 1990, during the visit of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of China, Qian Qichen, to India, 
agreements were reached on the bilateral 
development of relations in the sphere of economy, 
science, and culture [15, 21-23]. At these meetings, 
the border issue was also discussed. The result of 
the negotiations was the process of reducing the 
military contingent on both sides of the border, 
which began in 1991 [16]. Also, the exchange of 
military delegations of the two countries started 
from this period: meetings of defense ministers, 
chiefs of general staffs of armies, students of 
various military academies. 
Regular contacts of representatives of the two 
countries contributed to the further normalization 
of relations and the growth of economic 
cooperation. Successes in the negotiation process 
were consolidated in September 1993 during the 
visit of Indian Prime Minister Narishimha Rao to 
China. 
During this meeting, the leaders of the countries 
signed the “Agreement on maintaining peace and 
tranquility along the line of actual control” 
(September 7, 1993). This meant that the parties 
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agreed to support specific confidence-building 
measures, the conflict must, of course, be resolved 
solely through “peaceful and friendly 
consultations.” The agreement provided for the 
reduction of the military contingents of both 
countries in the border area to the lowest possible 
level, and a mechanism was developed to resolve 
sudden conflicts. Also, according to the 
Agreement, an expert group was created from 
representatives of law enforcement, political and 
diplomatic countries of both countries to clarify the 
line of actual control and specify confidence and 
security measures. 
 hus, the principle of mutual security was 
recognized as a priority in solving the current 
situation. Also, this Agreement was one of the first 
to be signed by two Asian powers that took control 
of armaments. 
4. Summary 
Of course, the stabilization of the situation between 
India and China was of great importance for the 
world as a whole in the supply chain. 
The agreements between India and China reached 
in the 1990s were important for the further 
development of bilateral relations. At the same 
time, it should be noted that in 1974 and 1998 the 
Republic of India conducted a series of tests of 
nuclear weapons. These events led India to the 
category of countries with unofficial nuclear 
capabilities. On the one hand, this increased the 
security level of the Republic of India, and on the 
other hand, it complicated the geopolitical 
situation. This became an argument for finding 
peaceful ways to resolve territorial disputes 
between India and China. Positive developments in 
the negotiation process had a positive impact on the 
development of the entire region. But at the same 
time, it should be noted that officially the border 
between the countries has not been defined yet. 
5. Conclusions 
It should be noted that in the second half of the 
20th century, the People's Republic of China and 
the Republic of India passed a tremendous path of 
development. The PRC emerged from the most 
profound economic and social trap in which it 
found itself after many years of wars of the first 
half of the 20th century and adventurous 
companies, in the second half and even in the last 
quarter of the 20th century. The same can be said 
about India, which, after a long colonial period, 
gained independence, and at the same time, the 
opportunity to develop independently politically 
and economically. 
The problem left by the PRC and India from the 
colonial period remains unresolved until now. 
However, the two powers coexist peacefully, 
having a strong and productive economic 
partnership, in 2017 the level of trade between the 
countries reached 84.4 billion dollars and continues 
to increase [16-20]. 
The long history of the territorial dispute is 
explained not only by the desire of the two 
countries to resolve the conflict in their favor but 
also by the internal political and foreign policy 
events that occurred during this period. This 
includes the Sino-Vietnamese war, and close 
cooperation between China and Pakistan, the 
recognition by India of the government of the 
People's Republic of Kampuchea and the killing of 
Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. But the global changes in 
the world, which began after the end of the Cold 
War, contributed to the fact that the two powers 
began to address the issue of disputed territories. 
Although at the moment the border goes along the 
line of actual control, the negotiation process 
between the two countries continues. 
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